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Abstract1 : This paper investigates the relationship between education and long-term 
unemployment when considering regional economic differences and other relevant 
variables at the individual and at the local level, using data from the 2004-2006 EU-SILC 
(11 countries). The analysis has been run using both a binary logit model and a binary 
scobit model. Our results suggest that the probability of an individual to be in long-term 
unemployment decreases with her educational level. There is a decrease in returns to 
education after the age of 40, which confirms the assumption of an obsolescence of skills 
defended in the human capital literature. With regard to the regional settings, younger 
workers (20-30) and older workers (50-65) tend to benefit more from the dynamics 
offered by highly competitive regions. 
 
JEL classification: J64, J01, J24 
Keywords: unemployment differentials, education and long-term unemployment, 
regional competitiveness. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank the comments and suggestions received from the participants to an internal 
seminar held at the EC-JRC-EAS-CRELL on June 4, 2010.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Theoretical and empirical explanations to employment differentials have been 
studied widely by the economics literature since the 1980s. However, among these 
studies, only a few incorporate the population’s educational attainment into the set of 
explanatory variables and even fewer adopt an international comparative perspective. As 
Brauns et al. (2001) point out, micro-level comparative research on unemployment is 
characterized as sparse and typically focuses on individual unemployment dynamics, 
duration dependence, and benefit disincentives. The present paper aims at contributing to 
this research gap by analyzing the role of the educational attainment of the population on 
unemployment differentials and the extent to which the importance of educational 
attainment depends on other factors, such as the age of the individual. 
Table 1 shows unemployment rates by level of educational attainment at the EU-
27 level as well as for the set of countries examined in this study (years 2004 to 2006). 
We can clearly observe that unemployment rates are negatively correlated with 
educational levels (except for Greece, where medium skilled workers experience the 
highest unemployment rates).  
Based on this observation and supported by relevant literature (e.g., Burridge and 
Gordon, 1981; Siegers, 1983; Simon, 1988; Holzer, 1993; Malizia and Ke, 1993; 
Partridge and Rickman, 1995), our hypothesis is that low educational attainment has a 
significant negative impact on long-term unemployment which is examined as a proxy of 
(lack of) employability. The latter is broadly defined in this paper as a combination of 
individual characteristics, skills and external factors, such as labour market institutions 
and socio-economic status, influencing individual capacity to get into and to remain into 
employment (Arjona Perez, Garrouste and Kozovska, 2010; McQuaid and Lindsay, 
2005). 
We test for this assumption of a negative correlation between education level and 
the probability of long-term unemployment by investigating the following sub-
hypotheses:  
(i) the higher educated are better off than the lower educated;  
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(ii) the level of competitiveness of regions (at the NUTS 2 level) affects 
differently individuals depending on their age. 
As well reviewed by Elhorst (2003), most studies are based upon single equation 
models (e.g., Beveridge curve modeling, cyclical sensitive modeling, amenity modeling), 
accounting identity models, implicit models (e.g., migration-based models, the NAIRU 
model and the Blanchard and Katz model) or simultaneous models. In this work we 
proxy the labour market dynamics with a composite indicator of regional competitiveness 
(RCI), which combines information on regional labor supply, labor demand and wage-
setting parameters at the NUTS 2 level.  
Our analysis investigates the determinants of long-term unemployment among 
active Europeans aged 20-65,  who where employed in 2004 and may have entered into 
unemployment during 2005, using the European Union Income and Living Conditions 
survey (EU SILC) 2004-2006 data. We look at a sample of eleven countries, assuming 
different behaviors across age groups and education levels.  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: while section 2 presents 
relevant theoretical perspectives used to guide the analysis, section 3 describes the data 
and the empirical model, section 4 discusses the results and their implication and section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A strong relationship between unemployment and education has been found in a 
number of studies, pointing out to different mechanism explaining the dynamics (e.g. 
Mincer, 1994; Spence, 1981; Kettunen, 1994; Winkelmann, 1996).The probability of 
(long-term) unemployment is unequally distributed among various groups in societies 
with considerable differences depending on educational qualifications (Wolbers, 2000). 
Increased education is likely to make the skills of an individual more valuable in 
production and consequently, for his/her employability prospects. In addition, it may also 
increase the efficiency of the matching process as more educated workers are more 
mobile and have a broader range of search possibilities, thus, decreasing their 
unemployment probability (Brunello et al, 2009).  
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This relationship between education and unemployment is explained partly by the 
signaling and screening theories. These studies suggest that employers hire workers on 
the basis of imperfect information about their real productivity levels (e.g. Stigler, 1962; 
Arrow, 1973) transmitted through their educational credentials, used as a filtering 
mechanism and a proxy for performance. Yet, Ho and Tan (2008) suggest that there is a 
non-monotonic relationship between human capital and unemployment, i.e. there is a 
threshold beyond which the impact of number of years of schooling on the probability of 
unemployment decreases. 
In addition to education, other relevant factors for determining the probability of 
entering or exiting from unemployment are related to the individual’s labour market 
biography. Prior working experience is considered as a way of accumulating human 
capital during one’s professional career (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Individuals with 
more experience are more attractive to employers as they can potentially invest less in 
their training. In fact, in many European countries the rising incidence of youth 
unemployment has been a major social problem since the 1970s (Brauns et al., 2001). 
Many young people enter into unemployment spells after leaving education, increasing 
their risk to find themselves unemployed years later and to face extended periods of 
social marginalization during their early careers. We can expect the importance of work 
experience to be true for up to a certain amount and highly sensitive to the educational 
qualification. In fact, obsolescence of skills can also start to play a role for older workers 
whose attractiveness to the labour market could decrease with age, especially if they have 
lower educational qualifications. 
Gender also has an important role. Women in general have less favorable 
prospects in the labour market as they often combine work with family duties and 
childcare (Wolbers, 2000; Blossfeld and Hakim, 1997). In fact, the unemployment rate 
for females in many European countries is higher than the one for men. Thus, we can 
expect that females would find it more difficult to exit from unemployment than males. 
Moreover, in many European countries a poor health, chronic diseases, and lifestyle 
factors are associated with being long-term unemployed or out of the labor market 
(Alavinia and Burdorf, 2008; Amilon and Wallette, 2009). 
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Furthermore, the type of contract is an important factor to consider when 
analysing the probability of falling into (long-term) unemployment. Its impact, however, 
depends greatly on the country taken into consideration. When examining the case of 
Germany, Giesecke and Groß (2003) found that fixed-term contracts increase the risk of 
finding another temporary job or of becoming unemployed after termination of the 
contract. Güell (2003) finds that for individuals in long-term unemployment spells, the 
probability of leaving unemployment decreased in the period after the introduction of 
fixed-term contracts in Spain. In any case, the influence of temporary/permanent 
contracts on entry and exit into/from (long-term) employment is highly dependent upon 
the country’s specific labour market regulations. Another element to take into account is 
the occupational status, as the labour market demand and unemployment perspectives 
differ by field of work and complexity of the tasks (European Commission 2008). 
General economic conditions at the regional level also affect substantially the 
transition rate from and to unemployment. Factors such as regional differences in 
industry composition, neighborhood effects affecting the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, various shocks to aggregate demand and institutional settings have an 
important role in explaining regional unemployment patterns (Evans and McCormick, 
1994). 
As Machin and Manning (1999) point out, one of the distinctive features of many 
European labour markets is the high proportion of long-term unemployed. The definition 
of long-term unemployment varies across countries and across international statistical 
agencies, ranging between 6 months (e.g., U.S. Labour Department) and more than 12 
months (e.g., Eurostat). The literature commonly makes use of the average minimum 
duration, namely 9 months, to characterize the entrance into a long-term unemployment 
spell. One reason for this choice is that job search efforts have proven to remain at a 
fairly high level for the first 9 months of unemployment but decline steadily thereafter, 
stabilizing at a much lower level after 18 months. Another reason for this 9-month 
threshold is that it also corresponds to the point after which the likelihood to leave 
unemployment declines due to the fact that employers tend to be more reluctant to hire 
someone unemployed for more than 9 months (Wong, Henson and Roy, 2005; Australian 
Council of Social Service, 2005). 
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Eurostat data for the EU shows that on average close to 45 % of the unemployed 
are in long-term unemployment (considered as being 12 months or more) with strong 
country differences (see Table 2.). A high proportion of long-term unemployment 
compared to total unemployment indicates that the burden of unemployment is 
concentrated on a relatively small number of people, often at risk of permanent 
detachment from the labour market (OECD, 2002). Heckman and Borjas (1980) find that 
past records of unemployment increase the probability of subsequent unemployment 
spells. Thus, future career prospects and income are strongly affected. OECD (2002) 
suggests that individuals in long-term unemployment are relatively more likely to 
become very-long-term unemployed in some countries and more likely to exit the labour 
force in others.  
Longer periods in unemployment have serious impact on individuals as well as in 
broader macroeconomic terms. There is a large amount of literature focusing on the 
impact of unemployment on individual well-being with effects such as deterioration in 
self-esteem, health problems and higher suicide rates (e.g. Clark, 1996; Korpi, 1997; 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). Another strand of the literature emphasises the 
adverse effects of a high level of long-term unemployment on the economy. Many of 
these studies focus on its influence on wage-setting behavior, as the upward pressure on 
wages from the supply side is likely to be higher in the presence of a high proportion of 
long-term unemployment within total unemployment (Machin and Manning, 1999). As 
described by Green (1984), long-term unemployment indicates that a substantial section 
of the labour force is in ‘surplus to the requirements’ of local employers. This ‘surplus’ 
may nevertheless coexist alongside relatively high rates of hiring and firing for other 
more employable parts of the labour force.  
In the following section we propose a model for the analysis of long-term 
unemployment which takes into account the different factors presented above. 
 
3. DATA  AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
EU-SILC is a multidimensional micro data survey conducted at the household 
level. It collects information on individuals’ labour market situation by month as well as 
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a number of relevant socio-economic variables such as health status, educational level, 
place of residence, type of occupation. In our study we use the EU-SILC 2004-2006 data 
for Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU) and Sweden (SE) to estimate the 
probability of being in unemployment for at least 9 months conditioned on the fact that 
the unemployment spell started in 2005 (after a period of employment). Thus, our sample 
is composed of individuals, aged 20-65 in 2006, who were active in 2004 and 2005 and 
may have entered a long-term unemployment spell (at least 9 consecutive months) in 
2005. The total sample size is 100116 individuals (see Table 3 for summary statistics). 
In order to explore the determinants of long-term unemployment on the European 
labour market, we estimate a binary response model in which we observe only the values 
of zero and one for the variable Y although there is a latent, unobserved continuous 
variable Y* that determines the value of Y: 
,ii
*
i uY += βX      (1) 
 
where  
0  if   1 >= *ii YY  
otherwise,   0=iY  
 
and where X represents a vector of random variables, and u a random disturbance term. 
The response variable is unempLT, which takes value 1 if the respondent declares at least 
9 consecutive months in unemployment in 2005 and value 0 otherwise (i.e. if employed 
and/or in unemployment for less than 9 months). 
In the reduced model2, among the microeconomic predictors composing X are the 
gender of the respondent, the number of years spent in paid work, the highest educational 
level completed (ISCED), the health status, the level of urbanisation of the place of 
residence, the type of most recent contract (permanent or temporary) and the main 
activity of business or employer (ISCO-88).  
                                                 
2 The reduction of the model was guided by the significance of each predictor estimated through univariate 
logit regressions and tests of linearity of the remaining continous variables before and after transformation 
(Box-Tidwell test and Turkey-Pregibon test).  
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With regard to gender, our reference level is female. Highest educational level is 
reported according to the ISCED classification (levels 0 to 6 as proposed by UNESCO). 
The ISCED levels have been grouped in three categories taking respectively the value of 
1 if low educated (ISCED 0-2), 2 if medium educated (ISCED 3-4) and 3 if high 
educated (ISCED 5-6), recomputed as dummies (edu1, edu2, edu3) where level 1 is the 
reference level. The health status is measured by the dummy variable healthy which takes 
value 1 if the respondent does not suffer from any chronic (long-standing) illness or 
condition and 0 otherwise. The level of urbanisation of the place of residence is a 
categorical variable that takes the value of 1 if thinly populated area, 2 if intermediate 
area and 3 if densely populated area. These categories have been recomputed as dummies 
urban1, urban2 and urban3 where level 3 is the reference level (and where level 2 was 
excluded from the reduced model due to non-significance). The type of contract is 
defined as permanent (=1) or temporary (=0) and the definition of the occupation follows 
the ISCO-88 at two digits with lower numbers corresponding to higher occupational 
level.3 
The occurrence of a high proportion of long-term unemployed is an evidence of 
profound dysfunction in a local labour market area. Indeed, studies on unemployment 
differentials that take into account the regional perspective and use simultaneous 
modelling are based on the hypothesis that regional unemployment both affects and is 
affected by regional factors of labour supply, labour demand and wages (Elhorst, 2003).   
In order to capture this regional market dynamics, we have added to the set of 
microdata extracted from the EU-SILC survey, a proxy index of regional competitiveness 
(RCI). The index is calculated at the NUTS 2 level and is composed of 11 pillars 
covering the characteristics of both the supply and the demand of the market (Figure 1). 
Each pillar is composed of a set of quantitative indicators which are aggregated based 
upon the literature and experts’ assessment. The pillars are grouped into three sub-
indexes, which are, in turn, summed up according to a specific weighting depending on 
the region’s development stage (medium, intermediate or high) 4. The RCI was added to 
                                                 
3 ISCO 0, corresponding to armed force, has been excluded. 
4  For a detailed description of the computation of the index, see Annoni and Kozovska (2010). 
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the set of predictors of LT unemployment as a censored continuous variable, taking 
values from 0 to 100, linearized by subtracting its square. 
The square of the experience predictor was also included in the regression to 
reflect the fact that the marginal effect of experience could decrease as the worker 
accumulates years spent in paid work. 
The generic logit regression was re-ran disaggregating first by educational level 
and then by age group5 to investigate potential differences in the probability to enter 
long-term unemployment spells between low educated, medium educated and high 
educated workers, but also between junior, experienced and senior workers. These 
disaggregations aim at exploring more specifically which groups of individuals are the 
most sensitive to unfavourable regional or geographical settings in terms of their 
probability to remain longer in unemployment. 
Despite the apparent fit of our model (confirmed by the Box-Tidwell test and 
Turkey-Pregibon test on the linearity of the logit with the continuous, or censored 
continous, predictors), the sample distribution of the response variable, unempLT, reveals 
that less than 5% of the observations take a value of 1, suggesting that the distribution of 
the dependant variable is skewed (Hilbe, 2009). Therefore, it appeared relevant to 
remodel unempLT as skewed, rather than as symmetric distribution around a mean of 0.5, 
and to check the capacity of this new assumption to improve the fit of our logit model. 
Skewed logistic regression (Scobit) was initially designed by Nagler (1994) to 
provide flexibility of where the logistic weight is distributed. The impact of the predictors 
can, therefore, be skewed away from 0.5, hence the name of the procedure. The scobit 
function is defined as  
α))exp(1/(11)|Pr( xbxy +−=  
 
where the fitted y, or μ, is the probability that y  takes the value of 1. 
                                                 
5 Preliminary results where derived from an analysis on three age-groups (20-29 ; 30-49 and 50-65) . It revealed 
low significance of almost all parameters for the mid-aged group, which encouraged us to explore further 
potential behavioral differences within clusters. The results presented in this paper are therefore based upon a 
7-level classification of age, namely 20-24 ; 25-29 ; 30-34 ; 35-39 ; 40-44 ; 45-49 ; and 50-65. 
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The scobit regression estimates μ, the probability of success, and an ancillary or 
location parameter that reflects the skew of the distribution. The point of the maximum 
impact of the scobit fitted values is constrained by the above formula to rest in the 
probability range of 0 to 0.632+, where 0.632+ is (1-1/e.e). The scobit model has itself 
been adjusted to allow for situations in which the maximum impact is outside the range 
specified above (Hilbe, 2009).  
After refining our logit model as a scobit model, we found that the scobit model 
improves the fit of the logit model in the following cases: the generic regression, the low-
educated and medium-educated workers regressions and the regressions by age-group for 
the 35 year-olds and above. The following section presents and discusses the robust 
results of the logit and scobit regressions on the reduced model6.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
We aim at evaluating the determinants of long-term unemployment as defined in 
Section 3, with a special emphasis on differentials between levels of educational 
attainment and age groups. The results of the model for the full sample (generic model) 
are presented in Table 4.  
When considering the generic (non-disaggregated) equation, we find that all 
coefficients are statistically significant at the .001 level in both the logit and the scobit 
models. In particular, the higher the educational level, the lower the probability of being 
in long-term unemployment. In terms of individual characteristics, whereas gender seems 
to affect the job prospects, with females being more at risk of joblessness, a good health 
helps to avoid long-term unemployment spells. Experience has a positive role on 
individual job perspectives. The occupation and the type of contract the worker had 
before unemployment are two elements that play an important role on the probability of 
suffering long-term unemployment. Indeed, having a short-term contract or working in a 
low-skilled occupation (high ISCO) are associated with increased risk of staying in 
unemployment for more than 9 months.  
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Living in a competitive region (as proxied by the Regional Competitiveness 
Index) also reduces the probability of staying unemployed. On the contrary, the higher 
the degree of urbanization, the higher the chances of getting trapped in a long-term 
unemployment spell. This result is in line with the economic empirical literature which 
finds a positive correlation between long-term unemployment and living in urban areas  
(e.g., O'Connell, McGuinness and Kelly, 2010). However, it should be noted that this 
latter result is not confirmed for all countries. For instance, in France, the level of 
urbanism is negatively correlated with long-term unemployment at a .01 level of 
statistical significance7.  
Partial analysis by level of educational attainment (or skills): The sample has been 
split into three groups according to the educational level of the respondents - low 
(ISCED97 levels 0-2), medium (ISCED97 levels 3-4), high (ISCED97 levels 5-6) - to 
evaluate how the estimated quantitative effect of the control variables in our model vary 
for different workers according to their overall skills levels. The estimated coefficients 
for each group are shown in Table 5. What the results from both the logit and scobit 
regressions reveal is the predominant statistical significance of gender, experience and 
type of contract across educational groups. The main differences can be observed (i) for 
the health status which appears strongly significant only for the medium-skilled workers; 
(ii) for the level of urbanism which is significant for the low- and medium-skilled but not 
for the high-skilled; and (iii) for the RCI, which is non-significant for the low-skilled and 
significant only at the .05 level for the high-skilled (against a .001 level significance for 
the medium-skilled).  
Partial results by age groups: The sample has been split into seven age groups 
(20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49 and 50-65 years olds) to evaluate how the role 
of the independent variables such as educational attainment and regional factors vary for 
different workers according to their age. Beyond providing a clearer picture of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Our model only contains the subset of variables that we have found to be significant, after having run an 
univariate logit regression for each variable to test for their significance independently and having then applied 
two linearity tests on the continuous variables (experience, ISCO and RCI) before and after transformation. 
7 Although the results are not presented in this paper, the logit model was also run disaggregating by country. 
These results are available upon request to the authors. 
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potential disparities among mid-aged workers8, this split allows for an in-depth analysis 
of the specific situation of groups considered at higher risk of unemployment, such as the 
youngster or mature workers and provides. These two later groups have indeed attracted 
much political (Cedefop, 2004; European Council, 2010) and research attention (e.g., 
Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory, 2001; Boeri, Layard and Nickell, 2000). The 
estimation results are presented in Table 5.  
Being a female increases the chances of remaining longer in unemployment, 
except for those workers close to retirement (50-65 year olds). Whereas the health status 
does not seem to affect the unemployment spell of the younger workers, its coefficient 
becomes statistically significant at mid-age (35-39 year-olds) and at the end of the career 
(50-65 year-olds). Moreover, although education attainment plays a significant role 
across ages, we observe a decrease in the effect education level after the age of 40, which 
confirms the assumption of an obsolescence of skills defended in the human capital 
literature (e.g., Ho and Tan, 2008). It is interesting to note that the marginal effect of 
higher-level skills (edu3) starts decreasing later (after the age of 50) than the marginal 
effect of medium-level skills (edu2) (after the age of 40). As expected, job experience has 
a similar effect on unemployment as educational attainment: among the youngest 
workers, a marginal increase in job experience reduces the probability of long-term 
unemployment relatively more than for the older workers. Despite the claim that 
temporary contracts may enlarge the employment opportunities of those at early stages of 
their career (Müller and Gangl, 2003), from our data, we observe that having a permanent 
contract is always significantly negatively correlated with long-term unemployment. 
Finally, with regard to the regional settings, younger workers (20-30) and older workers 
(50-65) tend to benefit more (as suggested by the negative and statistically significant 
correlation between RCI and long term unemployment observed in these sub-samples) 
from the dynamics offered by highly competitive regions than mid-aged workers 
(negative but non-significant coefficients). However, it is worth noticing the very weak 
value of the coefficients assigned to the RCI across age-groups, which reveals that in 
comparison to the other predictors plugged into our models, the RCI does not constitute 
                                                 
8 Traditionally, mid-aged workers correspond to the 30 to 50 year-olds. As explained in Footnote 5, we decided 
to disaggregate further this age-group to identify better the nature of assumed underlying behavioral 
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the most important one. When differentiating the predictors’ behavior across age groups, 
the degree of urbanization of the area in which the respondents live looses its statistical 
significance (except, to a certain extent, for the 50-65 year-olds, for whom it remains 
significant at the .05 level).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between educational level and the 
probability of long-term unemployment when considering regional economic differences 
(as proxied by the index of regional competitiveness developed by Annoni and Kozovska 
(2010)) and other relevant variables at the individual level (gender, experience, 
occupation, type of contract and health status) as well as at the local level (degree of 
urbanization). We have used a binary response model (logit) having also searched a better 
fit of the model through a skewed logistic regression (scobit).  
Considering the full sample from the EU-SILC 2005 of individuals aged 20-65, 
the results seem to confirm our initial hypothesis that the higher the educational level, the 
lower the probability of falling into long-term unemployment. The analysis of the results 
for the different age groups suggests that, although education attainment plays a 
significant role throughout the working life, there is a decrease in returns to education 
after the age of 40, which confirms the assumption of an obsolescence of skills defended 
in the human capital literature. With regard to the regional settings, younger workers (20-
30) and older workers (50-65) tend to benefit more from the dynamics offered by highly 
competitive regions (as suggested by the negative and statistically significant correlation 
between RCI and long term unemployment observed in these sub-samples) than mid-
aged workers (negative but non-significant coefficients).  
Furthermore, we have explored the effect of the other variables as determinants of 
long-term unemployment after breaking down the sample by level of educational 
attainment. The health status appears to be significant only for the medium-skilled 
workers, the level of urbanism is significant for the low- and medium-skilled but not for 
the high-skilled, whereas the regional competitiveness is significant only at the .05 level 
                                                                                                                                                 
heterogeneities.   
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for the high-skilled. These are some interesting findings which could be worth exploring 
further. 
As an extension of the work presented in this paper, we are currently working on 
a disaggregation by country controlling for regional dummies, and we aim at exploring 
further controls on foreign background, household composition (using variables such as 
number of young children), the characteristics of national welfare systems and other 
aspects which may affect the motivation to exit unemployment (as for example, the 
existence of house mortgage or other debts).  
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Figure 1. Composition of the Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) 
 
Source: Annoni and Kozovska (2010) 
  
 
Table 1. Unemployment rates (%), by highest level of educational attainment (15-64 
years old) 
 
Source: European Commission (2009) 
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
EU-27 12.3 12.2 11.8 9.6 9.3 8.3 5.1 5.0 4.6
Belgium 12.1 14.1 14.0 7.4 8.5 8.2 3.7 4.4 4.5
Estonia 21.1 15.3 13.5 10.7 9.3 6.3 6.0 4.0 3.3
Ireland 7.8 7.4 7.1 3.9 3.9 4.1 2.3 2.5 2.5
Greece 9.6 9.0 8.3 12.4 11.9 10.7 7.9 7.9 7.3
Spain 12.9 11.1 10.5 11.0 8.8 8.1 8.3 6.8 6.1
France 13.0 13.0 13.2 8.4 8.0 8.1 6.5 6.2 5.8
Italy 9.7 9.3 8.2 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.2 6.1 5.3
Luxembourg 7.0 6.4 6.6 4.4 3.8 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1
Austria 10.7 10.4 9.4 4.5 4.5 4.1 3.0 2.7 2.6
Finland 19.7 14.6 14.2 10.1 8.8 8.2 4.9 4.4 3.7
Sweden 10.3 14.4 13.9 6.7 7.2 6.3 4.0 4.8 4.4
Low (ISCED 0-2) Medium (ISCED 3-4) High (ISCED 5-6)
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Table 2. Long-term unemployment (12 months or more), % of total unemployment 
2004 2005 2006
EU-27 44.9 46.1 45.9
Belgium 49.6 51.7 51.2
Estonia 52.4 53.4 48.2
Ireland 34.3 33.4 32.2
Greece 54.8 52.1 54.3
Spain 32.6 24.5 21.7
France 39.0 41.1 42.1
Italy 49.6 49.9 49.6
Luxembourg 21.0 26.4 29.5
Austria 27.8 25.2 27.4
Finland 21.1 25.8 25.2
Sweden 17.8 : :  
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of the variables 
Long Term 
Unemployment Female Experience
Low 
Educated
Medium 
Educated
High 
Educated
No chronic 
illness or 
condition
Thinly 
populated 
area
Intermedia
te area
Densely 
populated 
area
Permanent 
contract Occupation
Regional 
Competitiv
ess index 
Variable 
name unempLT gender exp edu1 edu2 edu3 healthy  urban1 urban2 urban3 permcontract isco rci
N  256731 256728 178032 250584 250584 250584 224426 256730 256730 256730 119630 167129 229752
min   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.9
max   1 1 65 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 93 92.6
mean .0444707 .5088265 18.59067 .3425598    .4437634 .2136769 .79878   .3475753 .2585167    .393908 .8618156 49.02704  57.38684
sd  .2061388 .4999231 12.15657 .4745666     .4968284 .4099021 .400913    .4762012 .4378203   .4886158 .3450949 24.67474  17.77465  
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Table 4. Logit and scobit regressions on LT unemployment  
(full sample model and education-group models) 
Model comparison of logit vs. Scobit (generic and education groups regressions)
Logit Scobit Logit Scobit Logit Scobit Logit Scobit
gender              0.2583***        0.3301***        0.2940*** 0.4293** 0.2265**        0.3642**         0.2517*          0.2512   
(0.0513)         (0.0734)         (0.0815) (0.1407) (0.0782)          (0.1372)         (0.1247)         (0.1402)  
exp              ‐0.1052***     ‐0.1450***       ‐0.1129*** ‐0.1853*** ‐0.0945***   ‐0.1733***   ‐0.1151***   ‐0.1265***
(0.0074)         (0.0146)         (0.0111) (0.0333) (0.0120)        (0.0296)         (0.0189)         (0.0317)   
exp_2             0.0016***       0.0023***        0.0017*** 0.0029*** 0.0014***       0.0028***       0.0022***        0.0024** 
(0.0002)         (0.0003)         (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003)         (0.0006)         (0.0005)         (0.0007)   
edu2               ‐0.1950***       ‐0.2473**                                                               
(0.0592)         (0.0860)                                                               
edu3              ‐0.5285***      ‐0.7094***                                                               
(0.0847)         (0.1293)                                                               
healthy            ‐0.3226***       ‐0.4691***       ‐0.1697 ‐0.3140 ‐0.4482***     ‐0.6464***   ‐0.3175   ‐0.3649   
(0.0691)         (0.1008)         (0.1130) (0.1759) (0.1016)        (0.1664)         (0.1726)         (0.2376)   
urban1            ‐0.2427***      ‐0.3842***       ‐0.2867** ‐0.5122** ‐0.2734**   ‐0.5388***   0.0009 ‐0.0313   
(0.0574)         (0.0912)         (0.0913) (0.1796) (0.0866)         (0.1593)         (0.1416)         (0.1895)   
permcontract       ‐1.5231***       ‐2.1916***       ‐1.4541*** ‐2.3682*** ‐1.5587*** ‐3.2368***  ‐1.6241***    ‐1.7984***
(0.0550)         (0.2552)         (0.0877) (0.4808) (0.0839)         (0.7155)         (0.1333)         (0.5136)   
isco              0.0102***       0.0141***        0.0072*** 0.0095** 0.0104***      0.0184***       0.0167***        0.0197*  
(0.0012)         (0.0020)         (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0017)         (0.0038)         (0.0029)         (0.0081)   
rci              ‐0.0263***      ‐0.0362***       ‐0.0131 ‐0.0221 ‐0.0352***   ‐0.0664***  ‐0.0350*   ‐0.0354*  
(0.0062)         (0.0090)         (0.0110) (0.0180) (0.0091)         (0.0186)         (0.0139)         (0.0150)   
rci_2               0.0002***        0.0003***        0.0001 0.0002 0.0003**        0.0005**         0.0003*          0.0003*  
(0.0001)         (0.0001)         (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)        (0.0002)         (0.0001)         (0.0001)   
N                   100116           100116            28155 28155 45440            45440            26521            26521   
Log likelihood (Logit)  ‐7467.6171       ‐2749.5849 ‐3294.9883   ‐1410.7913 
Pseudo r2 0.1261 0.1214 0.1189 0.1245
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood (Scobit)  ‐7454.9044      ‐2743.4021 ‐3281.7643   ‐1410.5540   
Likelihood‐ratio test of alpha=1                                                               
Chi2(1) 25.43 12.37 26.45 0.47
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.4909
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The likelihood ratio test evaluates if the scobit model is significantly different from a logistic model (alpha=1). With a Chi2 p‐value under 0.05, 
the model is considered to differ from a similar logistic model.
The scobit regression is retained for interpretation in 3 cases out of 4, namely for the generic regression (model 1), the low skilled (model 2) 
and medium skilled (model 3) regressions. In the case of high skilled (model 4), the results from the logit regression are retained.
Generic  Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
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Table 5. Logit and scobit regressions on LT unemployment 
(full sample and age-group regressions) 
Model comparison of logit vs. Scobit (generic and age groups regressions)
Logit Scobit Logit Scobit Logit Scobit Logit Scobit
gender             0.2583***        0.3301***  0.4086**         0.4033**  0.2813*         0.2826*          0.0733  0.0996
(0.0513)         (0.0734)  (0.1535)         (0.1465)    (0.1217)         (0.1415)         (0.1242) (0.1398)
exp             ‐0.1052***     ‐0.1450***   ‐0.2569***      ‐0.2576**   ‐0.2609***      ‐0.2919***      ‐0.2376***       ‐0.2643***
(0.0074)         (0.0146)   (0.0537)         (0.0812)    (0.0305)         (0.0616)         (0.0293)         (0.0434)
exp_2             0.0016***      0.0023***   0.0047***        0.0047***  0.0041***        0.0046***        0.0049***        0.0056***
(0.0002)         (0.0003)   (0.0011)         (0.0013)    (0.0008)         (0.0010)         (0.0013)         (0.0016)
edu2              ‐0.1950***       ‐0.2473** ‐0.4131**       ‐0.4101*    ‐0.3043*         ‐0.3666          ‐0.4389**        ‐0.5205*
(0.0592)         (0.0860) (0.1566)        (0.1609)    (0.1451)         (0.2030)         (0.1553)         (0.2049)
edu3             ‐0.5285***      ‐0.7094*** ‐0.9627**       ‐0.9506*    ‐1.0119***       ‐1.1808**        ‐0.7917***       ‐0.9063**
(0.0847)         (0.1293) (0.3706)         (0.3763)    (0.2033)         (0.3826)         (0.2013)         (0.2759)
healthy           ‐0.3226***       ‐0.4691***   ‐0.0883         ‐0.0782    0.0124          ‐0.0440          ‐0.1652          ‐0.2024
(0.0691)         (0.1008)   (0.2575)         (0.2485)    (0.2216)         (0.2957)         (0.1978)         (0.2296)
urban1           ‐0.2427***      ‐0.3842***  ‐0.2305          ‐0.2221     ‐0.1595          ‐0.2041          ‐0.2278          ‐0.2564
(0.0574)         (0.0912)   (0.1603)         (0.1575)    (0.1329)         (0.1815)         (0.1456)         (0.1672)
permcontract       ‐1.5231***       ‐2.1916***   ‐0.7799***       ‐0.7608***  ‐1.2050***       ‐1.3611***       ‐1.3941***       ‐1.5318***
(0.0550)         (0.2552)   (0.1547)         (0.1519)    (0.1222)         (0.3155)         (0.1284)         (0.2305)
isco             0.0102***      0.0141***  0.0080*          0.0080*    0.0085**         0.0094**         0.0105***        0.0121***
(0.0012)         (0.0020)  (0.0038)         (0.0037)    (0.0029)         (0.0035)         (0.0030)         (0.0036)
rci             ‐0.0263***     ‐0.0362***    ‐0.0531**       ‐0.0495**   ‐0.0453***       ‐0.0555*         ‐0.0153          ‐0.0211
(0.0062)         (0.0090)    0188)        (0.0168)    (0.0130)         (0.0237)         (0.0144)         (0.0180)
rci_2               0.0002***        0.0003***              0.0003          0.0003    0.0003**         0.0004*          0.0001           0.0001
(0.0001)         (0.0001)      0002)        (0.0002)    (0.0001)         (0.0002)         (0.0001)         (0.0002)
N                   100116           100116                   5070            5070     10508            10508            13344            13344
Log likelihood (Lo  ‐7467.6171       ‐788.8871 ‐1273.8130       ‐1230.9212      
Pseudo r2 0.1261 0.0707 0.1064 0.1214
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood (Scobit)  ‐7454.9044      ‐788.4724    ‐1273.4634       ‐1230.4060
Likelihood‐ratio test of alpha=1
Chi2(1) 25.43 0.83 0.70 1.03
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.3625 0.4031 0.3101
(1) (5)              (6)            (7)          
Generic  20‐24 year‐olds 25‐29 year‐olds 30‐34 year‐olds
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Table 5. (Cont.) 
Logit Scobit Logit Scobit Logit Scobit Logit Scobit
0.1462           0.2746 0.1997           0.3036     ‐0.0320           0.1863          ‐0.3548** ‐0.3216   
(0.1435)         (0.2054) (0.1644)         (0.2127)    (0.1775)         (0.2926)         (0.1364) (0.2071)   
‐0.2208*** ‐0.3122*** ‐0.0495  ‐0.1295     ‐0.0475          ‐0.1731*         ‐0.0157 ‐0.0442   
(0.0213)         (0.0567) (0.0443)         (0.0831)    (0.0397)         (0.0876)         (0.0249) (0.0450)   
0.0034***        0.0052** ‐0.0017  ‐0.0006     ‐0.0013           0.0003          ‐0.0006 ‐0.0005   
(0.0005)         (0.0016) (0.0016)         (0.0024)    (0.0012)         (0.0022)         (0.0005) (0.0009)   
‐0.5757***       ‐0.7768*** ‐0.0299          ‐0.0332     0.0711           0.0880          ‐0.0470 ‐0.1487   
(0.1658)         (0.2336) (0.1743)         (0.2444)    (0.1815)         (0.3035)         (0.1467) (0.2262)   
‐1.0470***       ‐1.5054*** ‐0.7753**        ‐0.9307*   ‐0.8067**        ‐1.4303**        ‐0.0007 0.0323   
(0.2324)         (0.3767) (0.2723)         (0.3771)    (0.3038)         (0.5064)         (0.2071) (0.2993)   
‐0.6396***       ‐0.7220** ‐0.3476          ‐0.5110     ‐0.0217          ‐0.1046          ‐0.3513** ‐0.4867*  
(0.1800)         (0.2252) (0.1904)         (0.2651)    (0.2031)         (0.3214)         (0.1326) (0.1902)   
‐0.1444          ‐0.1679 ‐0.1530          ‐0.4295     ‐0.4388*         ‐0.5976          ‐0.2947* ‐0.5495*  
(0.1591)         (0.2034) (0.1668)         (0.2739)    (0.1858)         (0.3063)         (0.1435) (0.2456)   
‐1.5965***       ‐2.0278*** ‐1.8960***       ‐2.6503*** ‐2.0576***       ‐3.5398***       ‐1.9485*** ‐3.1958***
(0.1467)         (0.3269) (0.1629)         (0.4644)    (0.1732)         (0.5969)         (0.1383) (0.8411)   
0.0066           0.0080 0.0104**         0.0164**   0.0110**         0.0185**         0.0166*** 0.0261***
(0.0034)         (0.0045) (0.0035)         (0.0057)    (0.0037)         (0.0060)         (0.0029) (0.0068)   
0.0085           0.0077 0.0002          ‐0.0025     0.0078           0.0141           0.0665** 0.1060** 
(0.0179)         (0.0229) (0.0209)         (0.0320)    (0.0214)         (0.0358)         (0.0225) (0.0372)   
‐0.0001          ‐0.0001 0.0001           0.0002    0.0000           0.0000          ‐0.0004* ‐0.0007*  
(0.0002)         (0.0002) (0.0002)         (0.0003)    (0.0002)         (0.0003)         (0.0002) (0.0003)   
14341            14341 15041            15041    14482            14482            27330 27330   
‐979.3415        ‐872.3180         ‐767.2359        ‐1368.8470               
0.1691 0.1551 0.1858 0.1102               
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
‐976.0921 ‐868.3392    ‐757.7762       ‐1363.2546   
6.50 7.96 18.92 11.18
0.0108 0.0048 0.0000 0.0008
The scobit regression is retained for interpretation in 5 cases out of 8, namely for the generic regression (model 1) and the regressions on the 
35 year‐olds and above (models 8 ‐11). In the case of the 20‐24, 25‐29 and 30‐34 year‐olds (models 5‐7), the results from the logit regression 
are retained.
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
The likelihood ratio test evaluates if the scobit model is significantly different from a logistic model (alpha=1). With a Chi2 p‐value under 0.05, 
the model is considered to differ from a similar logistic model.
45‐49 year‐olds 50‐65 year‐olds35‐39 year‐olds 40‐44 year‐olds
(8)            (9)              (10) (11)            
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the regional settings, younger workers (20-30) and older workers (50-65) tend to benefit more from the 
dynamics offered by highly competitive regions. 
 
 
 28
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can place 
an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by 
sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
 29
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support 
for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a 
service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of 
science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves 
the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of special 
interests, whether private or national. 
 
 
 
LB
-N
A
-24450-EN
-C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
